Hiredis before version 1.0.1 is vulnurable to integer overflow if provided maliciously crafted or corrupted RESP mult-bulk protocol data. When parsing multi-bulk (array-like) replies, hiredis fails to check if count * sizeof(redisReply*) can be represented in SIZE_MAX. If it can not, and the calloc() call doesn't itself make this check, it would result in a short allocation and subsequent buffer overflow. Users of hiredis who are unable to update may set the maxelements context option to a value small enough that no overflow is possible.
Hiredis before version 1.0.1 is vulnurable to integer overflow if provided maliciously crafted or corrupted RESP mult-bulk protocol data. When parsing multi-bulk (array-like) replies, hiredis fails to check if count * sizeof(redisReply*) can be represented in SIZE_MAX. If it can not, and the calloc() call doesn't itself make this check, it would result in a short allocation and subsequent buffer overflow. Users of hiredis who are unable to update may set the maxelements context option to a value small enough that no overflow is possible.
https://github.com/redis/hiredis/security/advisories/GHSA-hfm9-39pp-55p2 https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/MEM07-C.+Ensure+that+the+arguments+to+calloc%28%29%2C+when+multiplied%2C+do+not+wrap https://github.com/redis/hiredis/commit/76a7b10005c70babee357a7d0f2becf28ec7ed1e
Vulmon